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CONTRACT DESIGN AND THE SHADING
PROBLEM
ROBERT E. SCOTT*
Despite recent advances in our understanding of contracting behavior,
economic contract theory has yet to identify the principal causes and effects
of contract breach. In this Article, I argue that opportunism is a primary
explanation for why commercial parties deliberately breach their contracts.
I develop a novel variation on opportunism that I identify as “shading,” a
behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems courts face in
rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation. I provide some
empirical support for the claim that shading behavior is both pervasive in
litigation over contract breach and extremely difficult for generalist courts
to detect, and I offer an explanation for why this is so. In contrast to courts
of equity in pre-industrial England, generalist courts today are tasked with
the challenge of interpreting contracts in a heterogeneous global economy.
This has left generalist courts incapable of identifying with any degree of
accuracy which of the litigants is behaving strategically. I advance the claim
that ex ante design by commercial parties is more effective in deterring
opportunism in litigation than ex post evaluation of the contractual context
by generalist courts. I illustrate this claim by focusing on the critical roles
of uncertainty and scale in determining how legally sophisticated parties,
both individually and collectively, design their contracts. By deploying
sophisticated design strategies tailored to particular environments, parties
are able both to reduce the risk of shading and to cabin the role of the
decision maker tasked with policing this difficult-to-verify behavior. I
conclude that judges and contract theorists must attend to the unique
characteristics of the contracts currently being designed by sophisticated
* Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for Contract and Economic
Organization, Columbia Law School. This Article develops ideas first presented as the Robert
F. Boden Lecture at Marquette Law School, October 2014. I am grateful for helpful comments
from Ron Gilson, Dean Joseph Kearney, Roy Kreitner, Chuck Sabel, and participants at a
faculty workshop at Tel Aviv University.

2

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[99:1

parties because it is the parties, not the courts, that reduce the risks of
opportunistic shading in contract adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION

The law and economics of contract has had a great forty-year run.
Three Nobel Prizes have been awarded to seven scholars for
breakthroughs in the economics of information, with others probably yet
to come.1 And, on the law side, there have been a number of seminal
papers explicating the economic logic of contract law as well as offering
trenchant normative critiques of inefficient doctrines.2 But despite these
advances, contract design, the central subject at the core of the law and

1. George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz were jointly awarded the Nobel
Prize in economics in 2001 for work on the implications of asymmetric information to contract
theory. The work of these scholars is summarized in Karl-Gustaf Löfgren et al., Markets with
Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph
Stiglitz, 104 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 195, 195 (2002). Subsequently, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric
Maskin, and Roger Myerson were awarded the Nobel Prize in 2007 for their contributions to
mechanism design theory. Finally, Jean Tirole was named the Nobel Laureate in economics in
2014 for his work on the economics of information and regulation.
2. For a review (and a critique) of the contribution of law and economics scholarship to
contract law, see Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003). For a defense of the contribution of law and
economics to contract law, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
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economics of contract, remains something of a mystery. To be sure, there
are a few notable papers3 and a well-developed (albeit largely
atheoretical) strategic management literature on contract design choices,4
but in truth we know very little about the factors that influence how
parties in the real world design their contracts. There are several reasons
for this gap in our understanding, but one in particular stands out:
Economic contract theory has failed to explain adequately the causes and
effects of contract breach. One reason for this deficit is that breach is a
difficult concept for economists to model. In equilibrium there is no
breach, and economics focuses on equilibrium conditions. But common
observation tells us that breach of contract is ubiquitous. Faced with this
wide gap between theory and reality, the answers to a critical empirical
question remain elusive: How do sophisticated parties adjust ex ante to
the prospect of breach ex post?
Understanding how parties adjust to the prospect of breach is
essential to a testable theory of contract, and nowhere is that knowledge
more relevant today than in the current debate over contract
interpretation.
Contract interpretation remains the single most
important source of commercial litigation and the least settled, most
contentious area of contemporary contract doctrine and scholarship.5
Initially framed by the clash between the two intellectual giants of
3. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The
Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel
& Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL
L. REV. 23 (2014); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006).
4. See Nicholas S. Argyres, Janet Bercovitz & Kyle J. Mayer, Complementarity and
Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts, 18 ORG. SCI.
3, 15 (2007) (“[C]ontractual partners . . . that had a longer history of transacting with each other
were more likely to include contingency planning in their contracts.”); Kyle J. Mayer &
Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry, 15
ORG. SCI. 394, 396 (2004) (finding that successive contracts between the same two contracting
partners become more complex over time as the partners learn how to address contracting
hazards); Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, Do Prior Alliances Influence Alliance
Contract Structure?, in STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: GOVERNANCE AND CONTRACTS 206, 207
(Africa Ariño & Jeffrey J. Reuer eds., 2006) (finding that contracts are more complete or
detailed when firms have prior alliances, whether with the same firm or other firms).
5. An early empirical study found that 25.8% of a sample of 500 cases raised
interpretation and parol evidence issues. Harold Shepherd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6
STAN. L. REV. 208, 222–24 (1954); see also David A. Dilts, Of Words and Contracts: Arbitration
and Lexicology, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 41, 43 (2005) (“The construction of contract language is the
controversy most evident in contract disputes.”); John P. Tomaszewski, The Pandora’s Box of
Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33
GONZ. L. REV. 417, 432 (1997–1998) (“Most contract litigation involves disputes over
construction of the terms in a contract.”).
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contract, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin, and continuing to the
present, two opposing positions have competed for dominance in contract
interpretation.6 Many (indeed most) states follow a traditional, common
law, “textualist” approach to interpretation.7 Here, when the writing is
clear, courts are disabled from inquiring into the context surrounding the
contract.8 In contrast, in states that follow California,9 and in all states
where the subject matter involves the sale of goods under the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), the courts are “contextualists.”10 Here, courts
are invited to consider the context regardless of the clarity of the written

6. For discussion, see Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra note 3, at 49–51.
7. A strong majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional textualist or
“formalist” approach to contract interpretation. A state-by-state survey of recent court
decisions shows that thirty-eight states follow the textualist approach to interpretation. Nine
states, joined by the UCC for sales cases and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, have
adopted a contextualist or anti-formalist interpretive regime. The remaining states’ doctrines
are indeterminate. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, 2-208 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 200, 209 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Robert
E. Scott, State-by-State Survey (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with author).
8. This interpretive approach, followed by a substantial majority of common law courts,
privileges integrated contracts over context evidence that arguably suggests the agreement
contained additional or different terms or meanings. Textualist jurisdictions, such as New
York, use a “hard” parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive effect to merger or
integration clauses and, in their absence, presumes that the contract is fully integrated if it
appears final and complete on its face. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven
Circle Gaming Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the prior
agreement is excluded where the writing appears in view of thoroughness and specificity to
embody a final agreement); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641, 643–44 (N.Y.
1991) (same); Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928) (upholding the “four corners”
presumption and excluding evidence of collateral agreement to land sale contract). In addition,
merger clauses are given virtually conclusive effect in New York. See Tempo Shain Corp. v.
Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a merger clause provision indicates
that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is precluded from
altering or interpreting the agreement.”); Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577
N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of
a written contract containing a merger clause.”).
9. See cases cited infra note 11.
10. The UCC adopts a broadly contextualist approach to interpretation. See U.C.C. §§ 1303 cmt. 1, 2-202 cmts. 1(b), 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). Article 2 of the
UCC, adopted in all states except Louisiana, governs all “transactions in goods.” Id. § 2-102.
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contract.11 Thus the battle is joined: text versus context.12
This battle over contract interpretation—which is better, text or
context?—illustrates the deep chasm that separates the scholarly debates
over contract doctrine from the real world of contract design. Contract
doctrine purports to address a single question: What should courts do?
Should a court adopt a hard or a soft parol evidence rule? Does the
11. Contextualists argue that formal interpretive rules excluding certain categories of
extrinsic evidence deprive the fact finder of indispensable information relevant to deciding the
case and thus can distort the court’s assessment of what the parties meant by their agreement.
Contextualist jurisdictions, such as California, carry this view to its logical limit and reject the
notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguous—context-free—meaning at
all. By the same logic, they favor a “soft” parol evidence rule. Here the test for integration
admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause declaring the
contract to be an integrated writing or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding the fact that the
writing appears final and complete on its face. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage
& Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational interpretation requires at least a
preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the
parties.”); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary
terms of deed on ground that “[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only
when the fact finder is likely to be misled”); see also Int’l Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 110
A.2d 186 (Pa. 1955) (finding extrinsic evidence of negotiations and antecedent agreements
admissible to show that buyer had not assented to the contract as a complete integration of the
contract, despite the presence of an express merger clause); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT LAW
§ 578 (1960) (“The fact that a written document contains one of these express provisions does
not prove that the document itself was ever assented to or ever became operative as a contract.
Neither does it exclude evidence that the document was not in fact assented to and therefore
never became operative.”).
12. The scholarly debate is both heated and voluminous. Textualist scholars emphasize
the importance of bespoke design of contracts and minimize the role of courts in reassessing
that design in litigation. For discussion, see Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design
and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2010)
(concluding that “[t]he revealed preferences of sophisticated parties support arguments by
Schwartz, Scott, and others that formalistic rules offer superior value for the interpretation and
enforcement of commercial contracts”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2; Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010). For the
contextualist, willfully restricting a court’s access to the trove of information bearing on the
parties’ real relationship degrades judicial interpretation and frustrates these parties’ efforts to
govern their transactions efficiently. For a sampling of the contextualist scholarship supporting
this view, see generally Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and
Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (2009); James W.
Bowers, Murphy’s Law and the Elementary Theory of Contract Interpretation: A Response to
Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (2005); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs.
Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for
Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2007–2008). Steven Burton has developed an intermediate view
that admits of some sources of extrinsic evidence but excludes other. See, e.g., STEVEN J.
BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009); Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on
Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J.
339 (2013).
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common law plain meaning rule still apply? Are merger clauses
conclusive evidence that the writing is integrated?13 But the design
choices lawyers make for their commercial clients are motivated by quite
different considerations. Transactional lawyers who design contracts for
sophisticated parties are much more concerned with managing the role of
a court in resolving contract disputes than in debates over styles of
interpretation. And, as I will argue, designing a contract that successfully
manages the court’s role is not an easy task.
My goal in this Article is to shift the focus of discussion from the
potential generalization of (competing) doctrinal prototypes to what I call
the design space for contracting: key features in the transactional
environment that incline contracting parties to choose a particular regime
and a complementary form of adjudication to govern their relationship.
Across this space, we observe parties writing contracts with very different
styles and forms. The question, then, is this: What motivates these
observable and predictable differences in contract design? In the
discussion that follows, I argue that a central objective motivating
sophisticated parties in each of these environments is to reduce the
anticipated opportunism costs that are inherent in ex post adjudication of
breach of contract claims.14 The task is difficult because exogenous
factors will determine which party is likely to behave opportunistically,
and any effort to design the contract to preclude one party from asserting
an opportunistic claim inevitably increases the risk of strategic behavior
by the counterparty.15 The design challenge is compounded by the fact
that opportunistic behavior, in whatever form and by whatever party, is
very difficult to discover during the litigation process. Hence, the
ultimate design goal is to avoid handing a generalist court an interpretive
task that the court is unlikely to be able to perform successfully.
Drawing on earlier work with Ronald Gilson and Charles Sabel,16 I

13. For a discussion of the ways common law courts address these various questions, see
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 537–42, 588–95 (5th ed.
2013).
14. While I will argue that a central purpose of contract design is to reduce the costs
associated with opportunistic behavior stimulated by contract disputes (particularly disputes
over the meaning of the contract), I do not mean, thereby, to suggest that this is the only
purpose of contract design. Clearly, parties also design contracts so as to maintain both parties’
opportunities and incentives to realize gains from the relationship over time. It is the case,
however, that maintaining the relationship requires a contractual design that reduces the
incentives for either party to advance strategic claims during litigation. See generally
Kostritsky, supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., id. at 72.
16. In previous work, my co-authors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and I have assessed
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sketch a typology illustrating the wide range of design options
sophisticated parties can use to cope with the risk of strategic behavior in
litigation. There are two crucial characteristics of the contracting
environment that influence how these parties design their contracts. The
first is the level of uncertainty—whether commercial practices are stable
and predictable, or, alternatively, are continuously disrupted by
unforeseeable changes in technical possibilities and market conditions.17
All else equal, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is
for parties to write complete, state-contingent contracts and the greater
the challenge for courts to interpret the parties’ instructions correctly.
The second crucial characteristic is the scope, thickness, or scale of the
market—whether there are many traders or only a few engaged in a
particular class of transaction using similar contracting strategies.18 All
else equal, the greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the
more likely that the contractual regime—terms adapted to current need
and a mechanism for adjusting terms as needs change—will be provided
by a collective entity, such as a trade association, and disputes arising
under it are likely to be resolved by a specialized arbitral body.19 By
how two key factors—uncertainty and scale—shape how contracting parties deal with a
particular manifestation of uncertainty: the need to change existing contracting practices in
order to respond to new circumstances created by changes in the economic environment. See
generally Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra note 3; Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E.
Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel
Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 172–74 (2013).
17. It is commonplace to follow Frank Knight and distinguish between risk—the
likelihood of an event that can be estimated probabilistically—and uncertainty—the likelihood
of whose occurrence, or even whether it could happen at all, is unknown. FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert
E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 433 n.2 (2009). Any particular transaction will present elements of both
risk and uncertainty but in different proportions. I will treat the term “low uncertainty” as
covering situations in which probabilistic assessments can be made in important respects, and
I will use the term “high uncertainty” for circumstances where probabilistic assessments are of
little consequence. Thus, a high level of uncertainty exists when exogenous events that may
affect the parties’ obligations to perform are unknown or cannot be estimated probabilistically.
In contrast, under conditions of low uncertainty, sophisticated parties can identify the relevant
risks that may impede future performance, estimate their occurrence probabilistically, and
allocate those risks in the resulting agreement. For a helpful discussion of how the incomplete
foresight associated with Knightian uncertainty is central to institutional (contractual) design,
see Rudolph Richter, Efficiency of Institutions: From the Perspective of New Institutional
Economics with Emphasis on Knightian Uncertainty 17–21 (July 13, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105604 [http://perma.cc/C5UU-X4PV].
18. A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or
services by using the same or similar contracting behaviors and strategies. Hence the
contracting is multilateral. In thin markets, the contracting is bilateral.
19. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 16, at 176–79.
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deploying sophisticated design strategies tailored to these particular
environments, parties are able both to reduce the risk of opportunism and
to cabin the role of the decision maker tasked with policing this difficultto-verify behavior.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I focus on a neglected area
of legal scholarship: What explains why parties breach their contracts?
Here I develop a novel variation on opportunism that I identify as
“shading,” a behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems
courts face in rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation. Part III
provides some empirical support for the claim that shading behavior is
both pervasive in litigation over contract breach and extremely difficult
for generalist courts to detect and offers an explanation for why this is so.
Part IV addresses history to show that in pre-industrial England
generalist courts, in contrast to today, were better able to police shading
behavior. The merger of law and equity together with the growing
heterogeneity of the modern global economy has left generalist courts
incapable of identifying, with any degree of accuracy, who among the
litigants is behaving strategically.
Finally in Part V, I focus on the critical roles of uncertainty and scale
in determining how legally sophisticated parties, both individually and
collectively, design their contracts. Here I advance the claim that, in each
of the environments that make up the design space for contracting, ex ante
design by commercial parties is a more effective means of deterring
opportunism than is ex post evaluation of the contractual context by
generalist courts. By deploying sophisticated design strategies tailored to
particular environments, parties are able to cabin (and thereby render
more effective) the role of the decision maker tasked with policing
difficult-to-verify shading behavior.
II. WHY DO CONTRACTING PARTIES BREACH?
The fundamental challenge for lawyers in designing a contract is that
contractual obligations are agreed to ex ante (at the time the contract is
formed) but are enforced ex post (after the transaction has broken down
and parties are litigating). Because courts have the benefit of hindsight,
the ex post world sometimes, though not always, resolves the
uncertainties of ex ante contracting. In order to resolve those
uncertainties, however, courts must be empowered to interpret contract
terms. But here is the rub: The invitation to interpret the agreement
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creates an opportunity for a mulligan,20 a “do-over,” where either party
can behave strategically. The party who is disappointed by subsequent
events may argue that the contract as written does not fully reflect the
parties’ true agreement, and conversely, the party who was blessed by fate
may argue that the contract as written is exactly what the parties intended
even though it appears in hindsight to lead to unreasonable results.21
Anticipating this problem, the challenge for contract design is to choose
between two very different options: either to expend additional drafting
and negotiating costs in order to devise innovative contract terms that
reduce the likelihood of future strategic behavior or to postpone those
costs and delegate discretion to a later court to root out and deter this
strategic behavior once litigation arises.
There are several reasons why contract law doctrine does not provide
any guidance on how best to respond to this challenge, but one in
particular stands out: Contract law scholars have neglected one of the
most significant reasons why parties are found to be in breach of their
contracts. The difficulty starts with a misspecification of the problem. It
is incorrect to think of contract breach as either the actions (or inactions)
of one party who thereby fails to perform its contractual obligations
satisfactorily. Properly understood, breach does not follow automatically
from the alleged non-performance of one of the parties to the contract.
Rather, breach is the legal conclusion reached by a court after it has
assessed the actions of both parties.22 So let’s ask the question more
precisely. Given the coercive power of the state to enforce contracts and
award compensatory damages, why do parties ever act in ways that lead
courts to declare a breach? There are three major explanations. First,
many actions that lead to breach are inadvertent; that is, parties are held
in breach because they are unable to provide a timely and conforming
performance. For our purposes it does not matter why—it could be
failures in production, supply, or any other of a host of exogenous shocks
that prevent full and complete performance. In any event, inadvertent
breach does not implicate contract design (at least not directly).
20. A “mulligan” is a second chance to perform an action, usually after the first chance
went wrong through bad luck or a blunder.
21. See Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman & Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of
Equity as Anti-Opportunism (Nw. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-15, Mar. 30, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245098 [http://perma.cc/AZ73-7UJV].
22. In litigation there is only one breacher, and that party frequently loses the entire
benefit of its bargain by sacrificing what may have been extremely valuable return rights in the
contract. I have elsewhere identified this as “the breacher-status” problem. See Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 983–84 (1983).
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What about advertent (or purposive) actions that result in a breach of
contract judgment? Here there are two candidates. One hypothesis can
be traced rather directly to an article that Charles Goetz and I wrote
thirty-five years ago.23 Developing an idea first suggested by Robert
Birmingham in 196924 and further developed by Richard Posner in 1972,25
we coined the phrase “efficient breach.” Efficient breach theory was
based on the premise that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an
obligation to perform but rather an obligation to choose between
performance and compensatory damages. Goetz and I explained the
standard default rule of expectation damages by hypothesizing that
“breach will occur where the breaching party anticipates that paying
compensation and allocating his resources to alternative uses will make
him ‘better off’ than performing his obligation.”26 It was a nice try but, in
fact, the theory does not fit the data very well. There are very few
examples in the case law of an efficient breach in which one party has
chosen not to perform and instead offered to pay the expectation
damages that are subsequently assessed by a court.27 What commercial
23. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. Rev. 554 (1977).
24. Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry
of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49.
25. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (2d ed. 1972).
26. Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 558.
27. A variant on the idea of efficient breach that I have offered elsewhere is to shift the
focus to “efficient salvage.” This analysis focuses on the question: which party has the
advantage in acquiring substitute goods in an imperfect market?
Once a regret contingency has occurred, the promisor has two principal options: (1)
perform the contract notwithstanding the contingency and accept any corresponding
losses or (2) breach the contract and pay a compensatory damage award. Since the
disappointed promisor will bear the full cost of the choice between “perform and
lose” and “breach and pay,” she is motivated to choose the least costly option. Thus,
if a seller believes that she can cover more cheaply than the buyer, she will simply
purchase substitute goods on her own initiative and perform her obligation by
supplying the substitute goods. (In such a case, the buyer may never know there was
ever a problem with the seller’s performance.) Indeed, there are strong incentives for
most sellers to select the ‘perform and lose’ option and not to breach. . . .
Thus, given the fact that the law requires compensation for breach, why would any
seller ever breach? One possible explanation is that the seller might breach when she
determines that the buyer is better able to cover on the market and thus reduce the
seller’s anticipated losses on the contract. Breach, under this conception, is a “cry for
help” by the seller. It is a request for the buyer to salvage the broken contract at least
cost and to send the seller the damage bill.
SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 13, at 113–15.
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parties do who wish to reserve an option on the contract performance is
to stipulate in the contract an exercise price for the option to terminate
and walk away from the contemplated exchange. The option may take
the form of “break up” fees, a stipulated damages clause, or a term that
permits one party to terminate, cancel, return, or redeem goods.28 What
parties do not do, however, is to leave the exercise price to be determined
at the discretion of a court following a declaration of contract breach. In
that sense, efficient breach is both a null set as well as an oxymoron. So,
while we meant well, Goetz and I are probably primarily responsible for
leading a generation of scholars down the wrong garden path.29
Does this mean that the data show there is no such thing as an
advertent breach in the sense of a conscious action that is later found by
a court to be a breach of a promise to perform? Not at all! There are
literally hundreds of cases where parties have been found by a court to
have consciously breached their obligations under the contract. The
interesting thing about these cases, however, is that “breach” is not the
result of a rational choice between the alternatives of undertaking a
performance that costs more than it is worth or paying equally costly
compensatory damages. Rather, it is a conclusion reached by a court
following a trial in which both parties insisted that their behavior was
entirely proper under the contract. So what is going on here?
One possibility is that one of the partieslet’s call him “the doofus”—
is simply miscalculating the kind of performance the contract requires. If
so, then the party’s actions are merely inadvertent, the product of a
mistaken judgment, and thus are no different from any other error that
prevents a party from performing as promised. A second—much more
likely—possibility, however, is that the dispute occurs because one of the
parties is welching on the deal. If we knew which party was behaving
strategically, we might well be tempted to label this latter behavior as
opportunism. Indeed, Ken Ayotte, Ezra Friedman, and Henry Smith
have recently argued that the risk of opportunistic breach is sufficiently
acute that courts should zealously police against opportunism by

28. For discussion see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the
Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. Rev. 1428 (2004).
29. The theory of efficient breach has stimulated a veritable cottage industry of scholarly
articles over the ensuing years. For a review of the literature, as well as an argument that the
choice between performance and the payment of compensatory damages is not properly
characterized as a choice whether to breach efficiently but rather should be understood as a
choice between alternative ways to perform the contract, see Daniel Markovits & Alan
Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1939 (2011).
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deploying their traditional equity powers to punish an opportunistic party
even in the face of a fully integrated and unambiguous written contract.30
They contend that this heightened risk of opportunism undermines any
argument that sophisticated parties are better equipped to deal with the
risk of opportunism in advance through rational contract design.
Contrary to the views of these scholars, however, I am going to defend
the view that reliance on contract design is, in fact, a better approach. My
claim is that what the proponents of a return to traditional equity believe
can be done as a matter of theory, generalist courts, in fact, cannot do (at
least not reliably).
Let’s begin with the concept of opportunism. Oliver Williamson
famously defined opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile.”31 But
that characterization isn’t quite right here: As it appears initially to the
court, both of the contracting parties are guileless. Thus, we need to sort
the behavior of the honest but mistaken breacher (who is not an
opportunist to be sanctioned by a court using its equity powers) from
behavior that is, in fact, self-interested but appears completely guileless.
So, let’s call the latter behavior that I am describing “shading,” as in
shading the truth. My hypothesis is that both the parties and the courts
face a fundamental dilemma: First, that shading behavior is ubiquitous,
and second, that it is nearly impossible for a court to sort out who is the
doofus and who is the shader. In the following parts of the Article, I try
to defend both of these propositions.
III. WHY IS SHADING PERVASIVE AND UNDETECTABLE?
Why is it that shading is so pervasive? There are several reasons, but
most important is the fact that all contracts—even those carefully drafted
in every detail—must be interpreted. Even if the interpretation is by a
formalist court that relies on the parol evidence and plain meaning rules
to limit its inquiry to the text of the agreement and its plain language, the
court is still required to harmonize and make coherent a contract with
over one hundred individual provisions, each of which may be
unambiguous when viewed in isolation but subject to interpretation when
taken together. This means that all contracts depend on courts to
implement correctly the ex ante instructions the parties have embedded
in their agreement.32 Those instructions can be framed either as “hard”
30. Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 21.
31. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979).
32. The state’s general rules of contract provide a set of standard gap-filling assumptions
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terms (precise, bright-line rules) or as “soft” terms (broad standards) or,
more often, as combinations of the two. But whether hard or soft, one
party or the other will obtain a significant ex post advantage whenever
there is a substantial exogenous shock between the time of contracting
and the time of performance.33 Thus, if the contract terms are hard, the
party with the apparent benefit of a bright-line rule, anticipating an
interpretation in its favor, can extort rents in return for agreeing to adjust
its behavior in ways that would reduce the ex post losses of the
counterparty. (Let’s call this Type I shading.) In light of the problem that
hard terms can work an injustice to the party who has been disadvantaged
by fate, many scholars have argued that courts should imply broad
standards of reasonableness or good-faith adjustment to moderate the
effects of the bright-line obligation that subsequently proves so vexing.34
But this strategy merely shifts the advantage to the counterparty.
Substituting a soft standardsuch as good-faith adjustmentfor the hard
rule merely creates a moral hazard risk on the other side, inviting a losing
party to exploit the court’s discretion by persuading it to reallocate losses
that were in fact allocated to the losing party by the contract (call this
Type II shading).35
Shading is not only pervasive but it is also difficult to detect. Often
the shader is entirely sincere in her belief that she has complied with the
contract and that it is the counterparty who is the breacher. There are
two related but distinct phenomena here. The first is the “noisy prisoner’s
dilemma” problem: It is very difficult for parties engaged in iterative acts
of performance to interpret correctly the behaviors of their counterparty.
A cooperative action can often be misinterpreted as a defection and vice

or default rules. But every contract requires the parties to provide some additional
individualized content. These combinations of express terms and default terms operate on two
distinct levels. On one level, they serve as an attempted interparty communication of the risks
and entitlements being exchanged. On another level, these terms, in combination,
communicate evidence of the contractual understanding to the state. Thus, they are signals of
the legal relationship between the parties. Unfortunately, these signals are inherently errorprone. For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
261 (1985).
33. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 977–81.
34. E.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1; Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of
Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982) Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments
Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 369 (1981).
35. Soft terms such as “good faith adjustment” remain as intractably ambiguous to judges
as to the parties themselves, especially since the promisor can act strategically in establishing
the facts and in persuading the court what “good faith” should entail.
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versa. This can lead to sincere but mistaken retaliation against a
perceived breach of trust.36 Second, there is a phenomenon that every
good commercial lawyer understands: The behavioral reality is that
agreeing before the fact to bear a low-probability, long-tail risk is quite a
different matter from being willing to absorb the entire cost of the event
once the risk materializes. The prospect of suffering large ex post losses
can produce a form of cognitive amnesia in which both parties are
convinced that their behavior is perfectly consistent with their contractual
obligations. To be sure, a party’s claim of compliance may be blatantly
strategic, in which case the court will be confronted with a self-conscious
opportunist in shader’s clothing. But in any event, there is no “breach”
in any meaningful sense of the word unless and until a court—acting as a
refereeassesses the evidence and makes a call.
One might be tempted at this juncture to turn to relational contract
theory and ask whether norms of trust, reciprocity, and the desire to
preserve one’s reputation will deter shading on the margin and avoid the
problem altogether.37 But relationships built on trust alone are little help
in this situation. Contract disputes of this sort present an end game, “bet
the ranch” situation in which the relationship will come to an end one way
or the other, so the shader has little to lose. Moreover, even if contracting
parties are willing to punish selfish or unfair actions by their counterparty,
as the behavioral research suggests,38 this won’t deter shading either. As
36. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 2005, 2031 (1987).
37. When parties choose formal contract, they enlist the state through the judicial system
to assess the performance of their specified rights and obligations and impose remedies in the
event of breach. Alternatively, parties can enforce the agreement informally by their actions
alone without judicial intervention. In this case, performance is encouraged and breach
penalized by the cancellation of expected future dealings with the counterparty, by the loss of
reputation (with the resulting reduction in future business with other potential counterparties
in the relevant economic and social communities), or by an individual taste for reciprocity that
rewards cooperation and punishes defection. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur:
The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 449–50 (1996);
Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981). An excellent survey of early
informal enforcement mechanisms is Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons
from Medieval Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
287 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). For discussion of how iterative interactions between parties to
long-term contracts can create a stable equilibrium of enforceable obligations in the absence of
a substantial exogenous shock, see Scott, supra note 36, at 2027–30.
38. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness and Contract
Design, 75 ECONOMETRICA 121 (2007); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Adding a Stick to the
Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (2007); Ernst Fehr,
Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental
Markets, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (1998).
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I have suggested, both parties see themselves as behaving fairly under the
circumstances and, therefore, feel that their actions are fully justified.
So what is a court supposed to do? As I mentioned earlier, several
scholars have recently argued for a return to traditional equity. On this
view, courts would make a Solomonic determination of who is the likely
opportunistic party and impose sanctions independently of what the
contract appears to require.39 But before we endorse that approach, we
must first answer a key empirical question: Can generalist courts find the
shaders among the doofuses? To begin to answer that question, I
assembled a data set of seventy-five randomly selected contract disputes
where the issue before the court was “who breached the contract”? I
tested two hypotheses. First, that disputes in which a party could
plausibly be guilty of either Type I or Type II shading are common.
Second, that courts in such cases would not (or could not) reliably identify
behavior as opportunistic. The hypothesis that shading disputes are
frequent is a function of the fact that disputes of this sort often require a
third party to resolve. The second hypothesis rests on the claim that
generalist courts lack the resources required to understand the underlying
context of the transaction and uncover subtle forms of aberrant behavior.
Conceding that there is a considerable amount of judgment involved
in my coding of the cases, the tentative findings are consistent with both
hypotheses. Of the sixty-six unique cases, fifty-four plausibly contained
either Type I or Type II shading. Of these fifty-four cases, self-interested
behavior was alleged in twenty cases. Of these twenty cases, the deciding
court found one party to be behaving opportunistically in only two
instances.40 To be sure, these results are only suggestive. These courts

39. See Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 21.
40. The empirical exercise examined a sample of cases for consistency with the two
hypotheses. Searches for “Contract Breach Ambiguity,” “Contract Breach Mistake,” and
“Contract Breach Plain Meaning” from “All State” and “All Federal” cases on Westlaw
produced a population of over ten thousand cases. A random sample of seventy-five cases was
selected from this population. The cases produced by each search term were first sorted by
relevance. Starting with the first case from each list, every fourth case was selected for the
sample for a total of twenty-five of the one hundred most relevant cases (i.e., cases one, five,
nine . . . ninety-seven). Conducting this procedure for each of the three search terms produced
a sample of seventy-five cases. Of these seventy-five cases, there were sixty-six unique cases.
The sixty-six cases were coded for (1) if Type I or Type II shading was a plausibly component
of the suit, (2) express or inferred claims by one party that the counterparty was behaving
strategically, and (3) if the court found that one party was indeed acting opportunistically. Each
case was then categorized as Category One (shading is plausible), Category Two (shading is
plausible and strategic behavior was alleged), or Category Three (shading is plausible, strategic
behavior was alleged, and the court found opportunistic behavior). See cases cited in
Appendix.
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could be resolving the doofus/shader determination sub rosa but are
declining to identify it explicitly. Moreover, in six of the cases where selfinterested behavior was alleged, the courts were just deciding appeals
from summary judgment or motions to dismiss and did not address the
issue of opportunistic behavior. But for those who hope that generalist
courts can deter opportunistic behavior in litigation, the judicial silence
gives us, at best, a very noisy signal.
There are other data that support the hypothesis that generalist courts
are poor candidates for using their equity powers to reduce the incidences
of opportunism. One line of analysis shows the difficulty of measuring
allegedly opportunistic behavior against the norms and customs of the
relevant trading community. Recent research on the medieval law
merchant by Emily Kadens and Lisa Bernstein’s extensive research on
20th century trade associations have shown that ongoing, “traditional”
dealings never crystalize into well-defined, customary usages of trade at
all.41 This evidence suggests that many courts, when asked to identify a
trade usage, rely exclusively on interested party testimony rather than on
a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions. For example,
evidence of a usage of trade as to the reasonable time for delivery of the
contract product may turn on the testimony of the plaintiff’s warehouse
manager that shipments usually arrive within three days. In short, there
is virtually no evidence that courts undertake the kind of empirical
investigations needed to find a relevant custom and then use the resulting
norm to identify opportunistic behavior—and even less reason to imagine
that they could succeed if they did.42 Long-term, reciprocal relations
41. See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153,
1176–77 (2012); Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and
Evidentiary Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy 18–21 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 669, 2014) [hereinafter Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts],
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366533 [http://perma.cc/Z4JM-49VK] (analyzing empirical evidence
showing courts typically rely on unreliable evidence to establish usages); Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Modern Economy 9–12 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 639, 2013) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy],
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242490 [http://perma.cc/JB6T-TJVN].
42. As a number of scholars have noted, the “incorporation mechanism” introduced into
the UCC by Karl Llewellyn has not functioned as he intended. See, e.g., James Whitman,
Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 174–75 (1987). Llewellyn believed that
customary practice had only an epistemological and not also a normative relevance. His
reservations about generalist courts were similar to those advanced here, and he was thus
unwilling to rely solely on judicial intuitions to undertake what was essentially an empirical
inquiry. As a consequence, he proposed a mechanism by which these local norms could be
identified by courts: The merchant tribunal was a panel of experts that would find specific
facts—such as whether the behavior of a contracting party was “commercially reasonable” in
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always reflect the idiosyncrasies of the histories of each party with the
others in the trading community, and these idiosyncrasies prevent the
community’s practice from settling into a determinate custom or practice.
Thus, even if generalist courts were better equipped for empirical
investigation than they normally are, there would typically be no custombased, context-embedded usage or practice for them to discover and use
in evaluating a litigating party’s actions.43
Here, then, is the dilemma: enforcing contracts requires
interpretation, which means the courts are asked to first identify and then
to police shading behavior, but attempting to perform these tasks often
leads to errors because the courts are asked to do more than they are able
to do.44 Left to their own devices, courts either will intervene too much
or too little. So, what is the alternative? How do we get just the right
amount of judicial policing of contracts? My argument is that
sophisticated contracting parties and their lawyers can, and in fact do,
design their contracts in ways that invite a court to perform this policing
function only when the court is likely to get the question right.
IV. POLICING SHADING AT COMMON LAW
But before we look at the ways contemporary commercial parties
design contracts that minimize the shading problem, we should remember
that the problem was not always this severe. At early common law, the
shading problem was contained by virtue of the historic division of roles
between law and equity.45 Historically, the English common law applied
two different sets of doctrines to interpret a disputed contract. The first
consisted of rulessuch as the parol evidence and plain meaning
rulesthat were cast in objective terms that minimized the need for
subjective judgment in their application. They were administered strictly,

the context of the particular dispute. But the abandonment of the merchant tribunal in the face
of opposition by members of the bar doomed this effort from the start. Imad D. Abyad, Note,
Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83
VA. L. REV. 429, 452 (1997) (“The courts in effect are abrogating the responsibility that the
Code drafters assigned to them by treating commercial reasonableness as garden-variety
reasonableness, left for the lay juries to decide on a case-by-case basis with no systematic
structure resulting from their decisions.”); Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 41,
at 20–21 (empirical evidence shows courts typically rely on unreliable evidence to establish
usages).
43. See Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt
eds., 2000).
44. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 271–72.
45. The discussion in this part draws on Kraus & Scott, supra note 12, at 1035–45.
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without exceptions for cases in which the application of a rule appeared
to defeat its purpose. These doctrines originated in the first seven
centuries of adjudication in King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the English
courts that produced the corpus of the common law from the twelfth to
the nineteenth centuries.46 The second set of doctrines consisted largely
of equitable principles originating in the English Court of Chancery,
which, by the end of the fourteenth century, began to exercise
overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts and to hear cases
that in “the ordinary course of law failed to provide justice.”47 These
doctrines were framed as broad principles administered loosely and were
designed to provide exceptions to the common law interpretive rules.
They were generally cast in subjective terms and, therefore, required
judges to exercise judgment by evaluating the fairness or the “equities”
of the particular transaction.
The Chancery’s willingness to provide an independent and alternative
forum stemmed from the perception that the common law courts were
incapable of policing opportunism because of the strict, rule-bound
inclination of common law judges to apply the common law rigorously
without reference to the context of the case at hand.48 The Chancery’s
sole focus in contrast was with the equities of the case at bar. Indeed, for
many years the Chancery’s decrees had no formal precedential effect,
which initially freed the Chancery from any concern that its contextspecific rulings could undermine the consistency and predictability of
contracting.49 And, important for our purposes, there was one key
46. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12–14 (4th ed. 2007).
47. Id. at 117. If parties had complaints that did not fit within the confines of existing
forms of action, they could petition the King. Even though the King’s Bench and Common
Pleas courts were created by statute, the King retained authority to hear cases in which he
believed the common law was “deficient.” In exceptional cases, the King took action by
granting a remedy as of grace. As these “exceptional” private suits became more common,
they were referred to the King’s council. Later, parties addressed their bills directly to the
Chancellor, who, under the authority of the council, took responsibility for assigning them to
appropriate courts for resolution. Id. at 117.
48. Id. at 104. In its earliest incarnation, the procedure in Chancery was the antithesis of
the procedure in common law courts: no writ was necessary, multiple issues could be joined,
evidence was taken free of formal rules, decisions were made by chancellor rather than a jury,
the court was always open, and trials could take place anywhere (including the Chancellor’s
home). Id. at 103–04.
49. “In Chancery each case turned on its own facts, and the chancellor did not interfere
with the general rules observed in courts of law. The decrees operated in personam; they were
binding on the parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding anyone else.” Id.
at 104. “So long as chancellors were seen as providing ad hoc remedies in individual cases,
there was no question of their jurisdiction bringing about legal change or making law.” Id. at
202.
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additional factor: In pre-industrial England, the Chancery was more
intimately familiar with the contextual environment of typical party
disputes and could fairly sort relevant from irrelevant facts. Thus even
though the Chancery reversed or avoided outcomes dictated by the
interpretive rules, these actions could be seen as necessary in order to
vindicate, rather than undermine, the common law.
Fundamentally, however, the institutions of the common law and the
Chancery were at cross-purposes. The result was two competing systems,
often with incompatible procedural and substantive doctrines yet
overlapping in jurisdiction.50 The ultimate result of the merger of law and
equity meant that the institutional framework of the state could no longer
by itself solve the shading problem. In consequence, commercial parties
today are likely to be poorly served if they choose to rely on subjective,
equitable review by contemporary courts. Lacking the requisite
specialization, courts today are relatively ineffective at uncovering the
underlying context that is essential if they are to police opportunism
effectively. In contrast to early courts of equity, when the courts were
close to the actors in a largely homogenous economy, generalist courts
today are removed from the enormously varied, commercial-contracting
context in modern economies and, therefore, are critically impaired in
their ability to divine how and when parties might seek to exploit the
uncertainties of ex post interpretation.
So, let’s abandon the ex post question that asks what contract
doctrines best help courts determine when to intervene to deter
opportunism. Rather, let’s ask the question from the ex ante perspective:
How can we design a contract that appropriately limits the risk of
opportunism and thus properly confines the court’s role in supervising the
contracting process?
V. POLICING SHADING THROUGH CONTRACT DESIGN
We return to the questions with which we began: How do
sophisticated parties and their skilled transactional lawyersthe contract
designers of this worldaddress the shading problem? Is it possible to
design a contract in which the court plays a superintending role that is
sensitive to the context the parties have created? Unfortunately, we have

50. Ironically, by the nineteenth century the Chancery had developed a set of procedures
more arcane and burdensome than the common law procedures it originally sought to mitigate.
The resulting administrative delay, combined with corruption born of the Chancery’s practice
of paying clerks on a fee basis rather than salary, ultimately led to the Chancery’s demise. Id.
at 111–12. Soon thereafter law and equity were merged. Id. at 114.
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only preliminary data to answer these questions because, as noted above,
contract design remains something of a mystery largely neglected by both
legal and economics scholars. Indeed, there is a large and growing
literature that demonstrates the resistance of contracts to change even in
the face of a significant exogenous shock. We know that boilerplate terms
in corporate indentures, sovereign bonds, and other standard form
contracts resist improvements that would appear to enhance contractual
efficiency.51 Even customized, bespoke contracting emerges from law
firm precedents that are tightly protected and resistant to amendment.
Yet despite these impediments, contracts do change in many different
ways, and the changes appear to be the product of intelligent design,
perhaps aided by a quasi-Darwinian evolutionary process of trial and
error. Studies of contemporary commercial practices that my colleagues,
Ron Gilson and Chuck Sabel, and I have undertaken over the past four
years show that sophisticated parties choose several different means of
anticipating and deterring shading behavior in the design of their
contractual regimes.52
To understand how contracts have evolved to address the shading
problem (even as exogenous shocks alter the business environment in
unpredictable ways), we should first begin by distinguishing two
fundamental design categories.
The first and most common is
customization or “tailoring” of familiar contractual formulations. This
involves changes in the terms within a particular instrument so as to better
address particular uncertainties with future states. Thus, for example, in
the past fifty years, parties have increasingly inserted vague terms such as
“best efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” or “commercially reasonable
efforts” as modifiers that are combined with specific or precise
performance obligations under the contract.53 Another example of
51. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013); see also Omri
Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
651 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
52. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 3; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 16; Ronald
J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010); Gilson, Sabel
& Scott, supra note 17.
53. At the time of contract formation, the parties have a comparative advantage over
courts because the parties share the benefits of efficient contracting. At the time of subsequent
litigation, however, the court will have the benefit of hindsight. Uncertainty has been resolved,
and the court sees realized facts rather than probability distributions. Because the parties
cannot foresee all contingencies, they can delegate to the court the task of completing the
contract ex post by considering relevant context. They indicate this intention by adopting a
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customization occurs in thick contractual markets where trade
associations or other collective bodies use an updating mechanism
external to the parties to propose changes in particular terms that will
ultimately be adopted by most, if not all, members of the collective body.54
A quite different design challenge has emerged, however, as a product
of the enhanced uncertainty triggered by the “information revolution.”
The changes in contract design that respond to the challenge of
heightened uncertainty are innovative in a much more fundamental way:
They involve mutations in the very form of a contractual agreement. In
this latter category we see radically incomplete contracts being used to
create binding preliminary commitments,55 manage supply chains,
structure complex platform production relationships, and build
pharmaceutical alliances.56 Parties in this environment of enhanced
uncertainty are doing something different, and we might surmise what
they are doing is an effort to solve the shading problem in novel ways.
The starting point for understanding these novel forms of contracting
is to focus on two critical characteristics of any particular contracting
environment.57 The first is the level of uncertainty—are commercial
practices stable and predictable, or are they disrupted by unforeseeable
changes in technical possibilities and market conditions? All else equal,
the higher the level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is for parties to
write, and courts to interpret, completely specified and fully integrated
contracts. Rather, when the level of uncertainty is high, sophisticated
parties develop agreements grounded in the commitment to a regular
exchange of private information but with no commitment as to the
product that this agreement will produce.58 The second characteristic is
general contract term—a standard such as “best efforts”—that directs the court to recover that
context evidence relevant to the particular obligation embedded in the contractually specified
term. With the aid of interpretation maxims, parties can design combinations of specific and
vague terms that more precisely define the “space” within which the court has discretion. Scott
& Triantis, supra note 3.
54. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745–54 (2001)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry]; Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 119–30 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out].
55. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007).
56. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 438–41.
57. The discussion in this part draws on Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 3.
58. My colleagues and I have previously described the character of the contracting
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the scope or thickness of the market—whether there are many traders, or
only a few, engaged in a particular class of transaction using similar
contracting strategies.59 All else equal, the greater the number of traders
engaged in a transaction, the more likely that the contract terms and the
rules for their interpretation—as well as a mechanism for adjusting terms
as needs change—will be provided by a collective entity, such as a trade
association, that can then provide a court the necessary context for
interpretation. The interplay of these two forces—uncertainty and
scale—points to the new forms of contracting among sophisticated parties
and, at the same time, helps clarify the (often-overwhelming) institutional
demands facing a generalist court asked to resolve competing claims by
parties to these agreements.
A. When Uncertainty is Low and the Market is Thin: The Case of the
(Relatively) Complete Contingent Contract
Uncertainty and scale together determine whether and how the
contract in question deals successfully with the shading problem. Begin
with the case of thin markets where the key variable is the level of
uncertainty: For example, think about the battle for evolving technology
in the market for electronics. Here the principal actors are few and
scattered. Thus, unlike, say, the grain industry, these parties cannot rely
on a trade association to institutionalize their design solutions because
problem facing parties in rapidly innovating industries with high levels of uncertainty:
[T]he transactions governed by these contracts share a number of characteristics.
First, the primary output is an innovative “product,” one whose characteristics, costs,
and manufacture, because of uncertainty, cannot be specified ex ante. Second,
neither party alone has the capacity to specify and develop the product’s
characteristics, costs, and methods of manufacture; hence, there must be
collaboration among companies with different capabilities. Third, the process of
specification and development will be iterative: Individual design elements will
depend on the recurrent input from those working upstream or downstream and from
those working on other design elements. Thus, central to these transactions are
communication and cooperation across the two (or more) firms—the design,
specification, and determination of manufacturing characteristics will be the result of
repeated interactive collaborative efforts by employees of separate firms with distinct
capabilities.
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 451 (footnote omitted).
59. A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or
services by using the same or similar contracting behaviors and strategies. In this respect,
similarity should be understood as a continuum. Broadly similar transactions may still have
significant idiosyncrasies, which will influence how a multilateral regime addresses markets that
are thick at a general level and thinner with respect to particular transactions. The polar
opposite—a thin market—exists when each contracting party must negotiate a bespoke
agreement with its counterparty. Here contracting is bilateral.
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the market is too thin. In these circumstances, contract design occurs
primarily in bilateral relationships, and here the level of uncertainty will
determine how the parties respond to the problem of shading.
When uncertainty is low—say, for example, a one-year license of
patented electronic software—sophisticated parties can turn to
customized, completely specified contracting.60 By incorporating any
context thought to be relevant as part of the “terms” of a complete,
formal agreement, they can specify precisely the evidentiary base that will
be made available to a court while still preserving the court’s historic role
in policing opportunism. For example, the contract can provide clear
directions to a court of the context within which the specified uses of the
licensed intellectual property are to be interpreted. This might include
(a) a “whereas” or “purpose” clause that describes the parties’ business
plans;61 (b) a series of definition clauses that ascribe particular meanings
60. The ideal for parties in this setting is to write a complete, state-contingent contract.
Such a contract specifies ex ante the parties’ obligations in each possible ex post state of the
world and is enforceable according to its terms, thereby assuring that performance occurs when,
but only when, it is efficient. But while complete, state-contingent contracts theoretically can
address the tension between efficient ex ante investment and efficient ex post performance, the
transaction costs of contracting frustrate this happy outcome. Of particular importance are the
information barriers that prevent parties from controlling moral hazard when the future states
of the world depend on their own actions. As a result, when the level of uncertainty is high,
contracts will be incomplete because it simply costs too much (or may be impossible) for
contracting parties to foresee and then describe appropriately the contractual outcomes for all
(or even most) of the possible future states of the world that might materialize. Not only is it
costly to specify what should happen in different future states, but it is costly to prove what
actually did happen. Thus, both ex ante and ex post contracting costs prevent parties from
writing complete, state-contingent contracts. For discussion, see Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra
note 17, at 452–53.
61. For example, see the following “purpose” clause from the Fountain Manufacturing
Agreement between Apple Computer, Inc. and SCI Systems, Inc.:
PURPOSE
Apple and SCI entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement on April 4, 1996 (the “Stock
Purchase Agreement”) pursuant to which SCI will purchase Apple’s manufacturing
facility located at 702 Bandley Drive, Fountain, Colorado (“Fountain”) and certain
related assets.
The parties desire that Apple engage SCI to assemble, test and package certain
Products, Service Units and Spare Parts, as defined below, on a turnkey basis at
Fountain on the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
This Agreement defines the general terms and conditions governing all transactions
between them for Products, Service Units and Spare Parts manufactured at Fountain.
Individual “Product Plans” attached as Addenda to this Agreement, and
incorporated herein by reference, define the specific terms and conditions for each
Product, Service Unit and/or Spare Part. The initial Product Plans are attached to
Exhibit A and numbered A-1 through A-11. Additional Products and Product Plans
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to words and terms that may vary from their plain or ordinary meaning;62
and (c) appendices that provide illustrations or examples of the
permissible uses of the licensed intellectual property as well as any
memoranda the parties want a court to consider in interpreting the
contract’s text.63 Alternatively, the parties can specify in the agreement
that the meaning of terms should be interpreted according to the customs
and norms of a particular industry or commercial community. This
additional context can supplement precise specifications of outcomes
while still constraining a future court’s discretion to range more widely
than the parties want ex ante.
The point here is simply that low uncertainty permits parties to design
a contract that dramatically reduces (if not eliminates) the need for courts
to inquire into any evidence extrinsic to the written agreement.64 By
reducing the burden on a court to characterize ex post shading behavior
accurately, a (relatively) complete contingent contract also reduces the
likelihood of a court’s making a mistake in interpreting the contract’s
terms. Correspondingly, it reduces the incentive for the party disfavored
by subsequent events (who, after all, is the likely shader) to engage in
opportunistic litigation in the first place. In the setting of a completely
specified contract, therefore, courts are less mistake prone and parties
less likely to encourage mistakes, resulting in less risk of judicial error.
B. Bilateral Contracting Under Moderate Uncertainty: The Case of Rules
and Standards
Now suppose the contracting parties confront moderate levels of
may be added to this Agreement by addenda to Exhibit A signed by both parties.
Such addenda will be numbered sequentially, A-12, A-13 and so on.
In consideration of the above and the mutual promises contained herein, Apple and
SCI agree as follows . . .
Fountain Manufacturing Agreement Between Apple Computer Inc., and SCI Systems, Inc.
(May 31, 1996) [hereinafter Fountain Manufacturing Agreement], http://contracts.onecle.com
/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [http://perma.cc/YD36-B6BS].
62. See, e.g., Data Management Outsourcing Agreement Between Allstate Insurance
Company and Acxiom Corporation, (March 19, 1999) [hereinafter Data Management
Outsourcing Agreement], http://contracts.onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.outsource.1999.03.19.sht
ml [http://perma.cc/NAZ6-LDEA] (defining thirty-four technical or non-standard meanings,
including specialized meanings of “Agreement,” “Confidential Information,” “Data Integrity,”
“Current Projects,” “Affiliate,” “End-User,” “Material Default,” “Party,” “Person,”
“Problem,” “Term,”’ “Work Order,” and “Work Product”).
63. See, e.g., Fountain Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 22 (providing a
list of “General Terms” ranging from the relationship of the parties to complete agreement).
64. For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 952–55.
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uncertainty in the sense that they can identify what should happen in
some, but not every, future states of the world. One clear example is the
decision to hire a sales representative to market the firm’s electronic
products following their manufacture. The parties can specify what they
want the agent to accomplish as matters stand at the time of drafting the
contract: They can identify the potential customer base, or geographic
region, and they can specify sales goals. But they cannot detail how the
agent will try to market the products, how the agent will allocate her time
across different products, or what adjustments the agent should make if
market conditions change or competitors alter their strategies. Similarly,
what if the product is a new drug and the contract contemplates a license
between the owner of the intellectual property and an agent who agrees
to secure regulatory approval and commercialize the product. Contracts
such as these exemplars will typically charge the agent/licensee with using
“commercially reasonable” or “best” efforts to accomplish the specified
tasks, reflecting the fact that the appropriate strategy is dependent on the
outcome of uncertain events, such as the market demand and competitive
conditions for the product in the first example and the results of clinical
tests and the course of the regulatory process in the second.65 The reason
to use standards is clear: Courts assess performance with respect to
standards only after the relevant future events have occurred. In this way,
parties can obtain the advantage of hindsight: The court has information
once the dispute arises that the parties lacked at the time of drafting the
contract.
Both of these examples illustrate the design challenge of granting the
agent some—but not too much—discretion in choosing the strategies that
best meet the parties ex ante expectations for performance. In this
intermediate range of uncertainty, sophisticated parties use design
strategies to constrain the discretion of a court later asked to assess the
agent’s behavior under the applicable standard. What we see is that
parties (or more accurately their transactional lawyers) combine precise
or specific obligations with the broad contractual standards.66 For
example, the contract may provide a list of specific actions the agent is
required to undertake as exemplars of behavior that meets the best
efforts standard. The specific obligations are directions about the context
through which the standard should be applied. By combining specific
terms with generalized obligations, the parties can add context evidence
65. For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092–95 (1981).
66. Scott & Triantis, supra note 3.
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that is revealed over the course of contract performance to the original
text of the agreement.67 The more effectively this context evidence can
be harnessed so as to limit the court’s discretion in applying the relevant
standard, the more attractive is the use of standards that take advantage
of the court’s hindsight advantage. In this way, the parties design a
contract to answer two key questions: When will the court look to context,
and who decides what context matters?68
When and to the extent parties design a regime that deploys these
broad standards thus depends on how effectively context can be specified
in ways that reduce the risk that a court can be persuaded by a shader to
misunderstand or misapply the standard.69 To reduce this risk, parties can
describe in the contract the context that will be relevant—what industry,
what kind of products, and, when possible, the evidence the court should
use to measure performance under the standard. In this way, the
contractually specified standard directs the court to make use of context
67. The listing of specific actions followed by the general standard of best efforts allows
the parties to harness the contract maxim ejusdem generis to delimit the set of conditions under
which the best efforts standard would apply. Under this maxim, when a list of specific
obligations precede a general standard, the specific words restrict the meaning of the general,
limiting it to action of the same general type. Scott & Triantis, supra note 3, at 848–51.
68. My colleagues and I have elaborated:
Under [these] conditions of [moderate] uncertainty, . . . parties predictably seek to
optimize total contracting costs by trading off the respective benefits and costs of
commitment and flexibility. They can do this by shifting costs between the front and
back end—the two stages—of the contracting process. . . . When the parties agree, for
instance, to use their best efforts or to behave in a commercially reasonable manner,
the subsequent adjudication of contractual disputes concerning their efforts or
behavior requires a court to give precise meaning to those vague phrases. Thus, by
using [standards such as these], parties delegate the specification of performance
requirements to a court at the back end of the contracting process. The parties must
bear the expected costs of litigation (including the costs of [shading] in their conduct).
But because a court has the benefit of some information unavailable to the parties at
the time of formation, adjudication potentially allows them to benefit from more
efficient performance standards than they could have specified ex ante. . . . The
parties thus tradeoff the benefits of ex ante precision (with resulting ex post
inefficiency) against the hindsight advantage of the court in later litigation tempered
by the moral hazard costs inherent in the process.
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 454–55.
69. The inability of the party seeking enforcement of the contract’s terms to observe the
counterparty’s costs (or to use any reliable proxy to check claimed increases) gives the putative
shader an even greater incentive to claim hardship under the contract terms, even when there
was none, to capture more of the contractual surplus. Thus, a contract that uses broad
standards but does not attempt to constrain the court’s discretion is inefficient: The enforcing
party will then anticipate the subsequent bad-faith claim for good-faith adjustment and take
precautions (such as entering into contingent contracts with other suppliers) that are costly in
themselves and produce suboptimal investment in specific assets.
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in addition to text, but limits the court’s inquiry to only that context
evidence that is relevant to the particular obligation embedded in the
standard.70 Thus even where the level of uncertainty calls for the use of
standards, it is the parties and not the courts that choose the balance
between text and context that best suits the level and kind of uncertainty
the transaction protects.
C. Bilateral Contracting with High Uncertainty: The Case of
Collaborative Agreements
A central design question remains: Can parties still solve the shading
problem when even greater uncertainties challenge the skills of contract
designers? As the level of uncertainty rises even higher, commercial
parties (and their lawyers) can no longer rely on the traditional forms of
contracting. Over the past fifteen years, the challenges of the information
revolution have led to increasing levels of uncertainty and motivated
parties in affected industries (and their lawyers) to innovate by designing
entirely new and radical forms of contracting.71 Electronics is a good
example of such an affected industry: Electronics firms compete with
each other to anticipate and design the next breakthrough in
technology—for example, the smart phone platform displaces the PC
only to find itself displaced by whatever comes next.72
This high-uncertainty environment, where an entirely new technology
can disrupt the status quo, has triggered a revolution in the basic form of
70. With the aid of interpretation maxims, parties can design combinations of precise and
vague terms that define more exactly the “space” within which a court has discretion in
interpreting the contract. The parties thus might use a precise term requiring adjustment of
the contract price together with a vague standard that catches the residual factors that are not
covered by the precise term alone. In enforcing this vague term, therefore, the court—aided
by the interpretation maxim of ejusdem generis (the general is limited by the specific)—will
only choose verifiable factors that are similar in kind or related to the precise terms. See Scott
& Triantis, supra note 3, at 848–51.
71. For discussion see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 442–48.
72. Beginning roughly in the 1980s and continuing to today, the profusion of new
technological possibilities associated with what is loosely called the information revolution
operated to intensify the systemic uncertainty arising faced by producers of electronics.
Innovations cascaded, often leading to improvement cycles that became self-perpetuating and
ultimately transforming the possibilities for new applications. The computer itself is a prime
example: Increases in computational power led to improved tools for the design of
microprocessors, more-sophisticated materials and more-exacting manufacturing techniques
for realizing the new designs. These improvements then led to further increases in the power
of computers, and the cycle then replayed. This increasing unpredictability is manifest as the
pervasive fear of what Clayton Christensen calls “disruptive” technologies. CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT
FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
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the contract. Lawyers for these parties have innovated by designing novel
collaborative agreements that only obligate the parties to explore
possibilities together without committing them to execute any specific
project. Even though there is a formal and very detailed contract of many
terms and pages, the contract regulates only the commitment to
collaborate, and not the course or the outcome of the collaboration,
which is left entirely unspecified. That means any effort to enforce this
agreement in court is limited to protecting each party’s promised
investment in the collaborative process rather than directing a division of
any surplus that might result if the collaboration were to succeed.73
Rather than relying primarily on the threat of legal enforcement, this
collaboration rests on a governance structure that, over time, creates
confidence in the capabilities and trust in the character of the
counterparty. Trust and confidence are extremely valuable commodities:
Not only do they motivate each party to invest in the relationship but they
also make the prospect of abandoning the relationship in order to
collaborate with others much less attractive.74
The governance of these commercial collaborations shares several
common elements. The first element is a commitment to an ongoing,
mutual exchange of private information designed to determine if a project
is feasible, and if so, how best to implement the parties’ joint objectives.75
The second element is a procedure for resolving disputes. Its key feature
is a requirement that the collaborators reach unanimous agreement on
crucial decisions, with persistent disagreement resolved by unanimous
agreement at higher levels of management from each firm.76 Together
these two mechanisms make each party’s character traits and substantive
capabilities observable and forestall misunderstandings. Working under
conditions of uncertainty, the parties can expect to encounter
unanticipated problems that can only be solved jointly and that may
generate occasions of disagreement. Their increasing knowledge of each
other’s capacities and willingness to share private information in service
of their collective goals facilitates the resolution of problems and
constrains opportunistic behavior.77
73. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs. Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 696–97 (S.D.
Ind. 2006) (holding that the contractual remedy for breach of a collaborative agreement is
limited to the right to terminate and retain accrued scientific information).
74. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 52, at 1405–10.
75. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 476–79.
76. Id. at 479–81.
77. Id. A non-exhaustive and non-random sample of collaborative contracts that
combine formal and informal elements in the manner described in the text can be found at
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The limited legal commitment contemplated by collaborative
contracting means that there is a significant constraint on the potential
role of a court charged with policing shading. Any resulting agreement
to produce a specified product or to purchase a key input to production
(the usual stuff of contracts) is not part of the formal contract at all.
Rather the substantive outputs of the collaboration develop only from the
informal relationship of mutual trust that is the result of the collaboration
process itself. In effect, collaborative contracting endogenizes trust by
formalizing a process that builds parties’ confidence in one another and
thereafter supports investments in their joint objectives based on the trust
created. It follows that a reviewing court’s primary focus will be limited
to questions of character rather than capability: Has one party cheated,
say by using information gained during the collaboration for its own
private purposes? Giving generalist courts the single responsibility of
rooting out “red-faced” cheating reduces any instinct the court may have

onecle.com, http://www.onecle.com, and the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute,
http://cori.missouri.edu [http://perma.cc/X8DW-92NB]. See, e.g., Agreement between Phoenix
Technologies
Ltd.
and
Intel
Corporation
(December
1995),
http://contracts.onecle.com/phoenix-tech/intel.supply.1995.12.18.shtml
[http://perma.cc/8YQE-6TZM] (supply contract for Phoenix to be a principal supplier of
system-level software to Intel); Airbus A320 Purchase Agreement between AVSA S.A.R.L.
and
New
Air
Corporation
(Apr.
20,
1999),
http://contracts.onecle.com/jetblue/airbus.a320.1999.04.20.shtml
[http://perma.cc/ZF2EHT4U] (JetBlue and Airbus purchasing agreement); Component Supply Agreement between
American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. and General Motors Corporation (February 18, 1994)
(on file with author) (requirements contract for motor vehicle components to be supplied by
AAM to GMM); Data Management Outsourcing Agreement, supra note 62 (contract for
Axciom to develop a data acquisition system to support Allstate’s underwriting of new business
in auto and property insurance); Development Agreement between Nanosys, Inc. and
Matsushita
Electric
Works,
Ltd.
(Nov.
18,
2002),
http://contracts.onecle.com/nanosys/matsushita.rd.2002.11.18.shtml [http://perma.cc/X8DW92NB] (collaboration agreement to develop photovoltaic devices with nano components in
Asia); Fountain Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 61 (a contract manufacturing
agreement for SCI to produce designated products at the Fountain, Colo., plant); General
Terms Agreement between the Boeing Company and Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (June 30, 2006)
(general terms agreement covering purchase orders by Boeing for particular product to be
supplied by Spirit); Long Term Agreement between John Deere & Company and Stanadyne
Corporation (five-year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration systems, injection
nozzles, and related products by Deere from Stanadyne); Research, Development and License
Agreement between Warner-Lambert Company and Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Sept. 1,
1999), http://contracts.onecle.com/ligand/warner.rd.1999.09.01.shtml [http://perma.cc/L3JBXG4E] (pharmaceutical research and development collaboration between “big pharma” and
“little pharma”). See also examples of collaborative contracts cited in George S. Geis, The
Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99 (2009).
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to roam farther into the commercial context in an attempt to find the
parties “true” intentions.78
D. Thick Markets and Low Uncertainty: The Case of Trade Associations
Let’s turn now and see how scale—the thickness of the market—
changes the landscape of contract design. All else equal, the greater the
number of traders engaged in the same kind of a transaction, the more
likely that the contracting infrastructure—terms adapted to current need
in the form of standard contracts and industry codes—will be provided
jointly as an industry-specific public good by a trade association. I have
just discussed how shocks in the economic environment produce
innovations in contractual form in bilateral relationships. Similarly,
exogenous factors can stimulate the creation of innovative contractual
forms in multilateral contexts. In such a case, the contract designs are
institutionalized outside the participating firms and arise when markets
are thick—many contracting parties are affected by the same exogenous
event or, even in the absence of such an event, many parties are acting in
the same commercial environment.
Consider, for example, the market for key commodities—grain,
cotton, and the like. Here we encounter a thick market where many
parties engage in the same or similar forms of contracting. When markets
78. Eli Lilly, 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, is an example of a court that was able to solve the
shading problem by focusing solely on the opportunistic behavior of the shader. The parties to
this pharma/biotech collaboration had entered into a form of agreement that committed each
party to share private information in the hopes of a collective scientific breakthrough. Lilly
subsequently undertook secret research projects using information that had been jointly
developed. Holding that Lilly had breached the contract and therefore forfeited its investment
in the joint project, the court concluded:
Lilly and Emisphere entered into a close, collaborative research relationship that
required trust and good faith on both sides. After several years of joint research, Lilly
decided it really did not need Emisphere any further, so it decided to pursue a secret
research strategy in breach of its contractual obligations to Emisphere. The parties
in this case are both highly sophisticated and well-counseled businesses that have the
right to try to exercise their full legal rights under the relevant contracts. Lilly has
asserted theories to justify its actions under the contracts, but those theories are not
supported by the evidence or the law.
Id. at 697. By sanctioning only “red faced” violations of the collaborative agreement, such as
the secret research group formed by Lilly outside the informal exchanges created by the
agreement itself, the court did not attempt to regulate the nature or course of the collaborative
interactions. Thus, the maintenance of the collaboration protocols established by the parties,
and of the resulting specific investments in information exchange, was left entirely within the
province of the internally generated, informal enforcement mechanism. The formal
enforcement only excluded a (secret) alternative process that undermined the trust that was in
fact generated through collaboration.
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are thick, the costs of design can be spread in the sense that many actors
face similar risks and stand to benefit from concerted responses to them.
In this environment, the affected parties often institutionalize their
contract design through the collective action of industry associations.
Once again, the design challenge will vary according to the level of
uncertainty faced by the actors, but scaling the contractual product
permits novel solutions to the shading problem.
Notice how scale changes the parties’ design responses even in low
uncertainty settings. Let’s assume that commercial practices in a
particular industry are stable and well understood by a substantial
community of traders. Nevertheless, a generalist judge cannot be
expected to have knowledge of such embedded trade practices or be able
to conveniently obtain the information needed to make an accurate
determination of which party is the shader.79 So the trade association has
to cope with the adverse consequences of judicial ignorance while, at the
same time, creating a framework to reduce the risk of shading. This
challenge motivates the trade association to engage in innovative design.
What is the result? Many of these trade groups have chosen to rely on
expert arbitrators to strictly enforce industry-approved, standardized
contract terms. They regularly update the terms to keep them current
with practice as it evolves. In this way, the trade group enlists a third
party with a limited charge: Just monitor the shading risk by holding
parties to the strict terms of the contract.80 But what about context—the
party-to-party adjustments that are always necessary as changed
conditions affect performance? That is left entirely to relational norms
of reciprocity (tit for tat) and the discipline of repeated dealings.81 As a
consequence, the risk of parties’ making strategic arguments about the
“true agreement” is eliminated. This is a solution that cabins the court’s
79. The problem here is that a generalist court is (and will remain) largely ignorant of the
common knowledge of the trade. The goal of the collective regime that emerges is to design
contracts in ways that (a) “render[s] insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated
into everyday contracting,” (b) “establish[es] methods for the expeditious resolution of
disputes arising under these agreements,” and (c) “institutionalize[s] a process for keeping
terms and forms of dispute resolution abreast of developments in the economic environment.”
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 16, at 200–02.
80. The contracting regime in the U.S. cotton industry that originated in the midnineteenth century and took on its modern form in the 1920s is a prominent example of this
cluster of functions. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 54,
at 1724, 1745–54. For discussion of analogous multilateral regimes, see Bernstein, Opting Out,
supra note 54; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 54, at 1765, 1771–77.
81. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 54, at 1743–
44 (describing the informal flexibility of transactors and the importance of adjudicative
unwillingness to transform this flexibility into an obligation).
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enforcement role much more successfully than in the parallel case of the
bilateral standardized agreement—the paradigmatic exchange of
purchase order and acknowledgment forms—that is governed by the
context-friendly UCC.82
E. Thick Markets and Higher Uncertainty: The Case of Expert Courts
What happens in thick markets when uncertainty increases and, as in
the case of bilateral contracting, the parties need to rely on standards so
as to harness the hindsight advantage of a court?83 Consider the setting
where there are a large number of highly complex transactions that share
general features but where each transaction has significant idiosyncrasies
and the common background conditions shift rapidly. This is the setting
in which, for example, the legal rules governing the obligations of boards
of directors in corporate acquisitions are applied. One way to understand
why a majority of U.S. public corporations choose Delaware as an
incorporation state is that it serves to allocate to the Delaware Court of
Chancery jurisdiction to resolve fiduciary duty issues. Delaware
corporate law gives corporations wide latitude to adopt specific rules
governing their behavior, but, in fact, Delaware corporations appear to
have limited their ex ante contracting in the articles of incorporation and
bylaws to formal issues such as meeting dates. The reason is uncertainty:
A corporation’s circumstances and the evolution of the market for
corporate control are too uncertain to specify ex ante conduct rules that
will govern all of the corporation’s activities in the future.84 Formal
compliance with ex ante rules thus remains subject to ex post court review
82. The problem with sales law contracts governed by the UCC is that the number of
parties, their relatively small size, and the idiosyncrasies of their dealings make the
development of an interpretive community, such as in the cotton market, infeasible. The
heightened risk of error by a generalist court seeking to police shading is a function of two core
problems. The first is the growing evidence that, even in a stable world, custom and practice
do not tend towards the kind of equillibria that can be captured in a rule, and that in a world of
uncertainty even such jittery constancy as exists in commercial practice in quiet environments
is constantly changing in response to exogenous and endogenous factors. See id. at 1743–44,
1775–76 (discussing the interaction of exogenous factors and endogenous shading responses by
the parties). In short, there may not be any stable custom or usage for the court to find as a
fact, as the legal doctrine currently assumes can be done. Second, and perhaps for the foregoing
reasons, there is growing evidence that generalist courts do not to even try to find the relevant
custom and usages. This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking expertise, rely on
interested party testimony and unsupported assumptions of reasonable commercial behavior
rather than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions. Bernstein, Trade Usage
in the Courts, supra note 41, at 14–18.
83. This section draws on Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra note 3, at 92–95.
84. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?:
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87 (2001).
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through a standard—the director and officer’s overriding obligation of
fiduciary duty.85 Just as contracting parties operating under increasing
uncertainty rely on standards to harness a court’s hindsight advantage, ex
post gaps in a corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws are
similarly filled by a standard. But the thick market enables a corporation
to mitigate the shading problem by incorporating in a jurisdiction that has
sufficient scale of incorporations that its judges develop the necessary
experience and expertise.86 In this respect, a modern court of equity
resembles the early English courts of equity—the Delaware Chancery
Court has deep knowledge of the community whose disputes it resolves,
as did the early courts of equity with respect to the homogenous economy
in which its litigants operated.
In this case, the uncertainty stems from the strategic interaction of the
various corporate actors intent on manipulating open-ended rules in
volatile environments to advance their private interests. On the one
hand, the parties know the general rules that apply, but they also know
that the counterparty will seek to exploit those rules to its advantage. To
the extent that actors in such an environment take collective actions to
reduce the very uncertainty to which they have contributed, with the
complementary aim of reducing the chance of judicial error in ex post
application of standards such as fiduciary duty, they are able to rely on
expert judges with significant experience in the field—to rely, that is, on
a specialized court of equity. The specialization of the court and its
equitable powers assure parties that, despite the impossibility of codifying
decision rules, judicial decisions will be taken with the fullest possible
awareness of current understandings of good practice; that is, the court
can with reasonable accuracy assess the context because it is part of it.
There are other examples of courts that have the favorable attributes
I have ascribed to early courts of equity. This expertise results often from
geographical concentration of industry and therefore cases.87 The Santa
Clara County Superior Court, which is the California trial court for much
85. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are
Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule
of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 882 (2005) (describing Delaware’s judiciary as
being known for its “use of [the equitable principles of fiduciary duty] to restrain otherwise
lawful conduct”). Those familiar with the common structure of Chancery Court opinions will
recall that there is uniformly a lengthy and very detailed account of the facts—who negotiated
with whom, what did they say, etc.—in cases that apply a fiduciary standard.
86. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 14–17
(2006); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 845–47 (1995).
87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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of Silicon Valley, is generalist in terms of jurisdiction but is specialized as
a result of geographic industrial concentration (rather than the virtual
concentration observed in Delaware).88 Such a match between local
courts and local industry provides an effective legal infrastructure for an
industrial district;89 the generalist court acquires the expertise to well
serve its litigants—in this regard, it becomes a specialist.
Under certain conditions, therefore, parties use their scale to invest a
particular court with expertise in discovering the relevant context. Courts
in these areas of geographic concentration of similar contracting parties
can over time develop both judicial expertise in the subject matter and a
body of precedents that can parallel the private interpretive regimes
created by trade associations. In effect, in instances such as the Delaware
Court of Chancery and the Santa Clara County Superior Court, we see a
contracting regime that reflects both the constraints imposed by the
problems of uncertainty and scale and the potential that generalist courts
may become specialist courts through repeated exposure to the particular
industry. Under these circumstances, a generalist court can serve a
geographic concentration of similar contracting parties by engaging in
contextualist interpretation in careful and skillful ways that help parties
in their quest to solve the shading problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion is only illustrative of the many variations in
contract design where commercial parties have sought to mark out the
courts’ role in the interpretive process. The central idea is that the level
of uncertainty and the thickness of the relevant market will determine the
range of design strategies that are found in contemporary commercial
transactions. In each of these cases, my analysis suggests that a primary
objective is to design a contract that meshes with the relational or
informal enforcement that the context provides and thereby serves to
cabin the role of the decision maker tasked with policing difficult-toverify shading behavior.
Contracting parties must be able to count on the state’s enforcement
monopoly if they are confidently to rely on the novel forms of agreement
88. See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87
IND. L.J. 1345, 1397 (2012) (describing how “many corporate suits are brought in . . . the Santa
Clara County Superior Court . . . [which] has correspondingly developed considerable
familiarity with corporate cases”).
89. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578
(1999) (role of law in supporting industrial districts).
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afforded by the relevant design space. Ideally, generalist courts should
respond to novel contract designs by enforcing the chosen methods of
mutual cooperation on terms consistent with the arrangements
themselves. A court’s ability to achieve this consistency will depend very
generally on (a) its expertise in the domain of the contract, (b) the
conspicuousness of the particular contractual regime (i.e., the salience of
the industry codes or other markers that indicate to outsiders that insiders
have given distinctive meaning and effect to strategies for coping with
shading), and (c) the extent to which the court respects the purposes and
values to which the regime is dedicated.
The role of generalist courts will differ across the various dimensions
I have outlined, but in all events it will be more restricted than the
standard account under which the court is supposed to fit quite different
forms of contracting into the traditional doctrinal categories of common
law contract. If a central goal of contract adjudication is to enforce the
contract that the parties have provided, then the courts need to accept the
role that the parties have given them. To do that, both judges and
contract theorists must attend to the unique characteristics of the
contracts currently being designed by sophisticated parties. Here courts
must practice the passive virtues because it is the parties, and not the
courts, that reduce the risks of opportunism in contract adjudication.
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